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- 1 Spoke to Mr. Reber respecting his report on discussions with [] and [] of the Office of DD/P respecting specific intelligence support for operations and suggested that he make it plain to the Office of DD/P that such requests should be brought to his attention so that any possible questions of priorities, etc. could be passed upon by the Office of DD/I. 19 January, 5

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- 2 Also Discussed with [] the problem of disseminating sensitive intelligence items to operational units. I suggested that there was an obligation upon the Intelligence Offices to exercise some ingenuity in giving hints and other direction to operational units, so as to enable them to take advantage of intelligence without in any way revealing source. This, in my view, was a full-time operation and we would probably have to set up a unit to do it in each of the offices of origin, in which control over this type of dissemination should be vested. I felt that at present we were most deficient in this type of activity. The objective should be to train the operators not to ask for source information or intelligence (thereby acting as their own intelligence offices), but to afford them such intelligence service that they would not require the basic intelligence itself. 20 March, 13

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Called to the attention of Mr. Wisner and [] of FE Division a Special Intelligence Digest item relating to Chengtu. Suggested to [] and Mr. [] that they establish some direct liaison in order to insure that such items are called to the attention of the Operational Offices. There is a good field for cross fertilization here. 23 July, 1

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- 4 After talking with Mr. [] respecting his investigation of the intelligence support afforded the Operational Offices, I raised with Mr. Wisner the question of organic intelligence units for Operational Offices. It seemed to me that it was not feasible to obtain adequate support for these Offices from other agencies, nor was CIA's normal organization to afford intelligence for the NSC adequate to Operational needs. I suggested that we have this situation surveyed and Mr. Wisner was in agreement. 24 July, 8

5 At the IADs' meeting announced the survey to be undertaken on behalf of DD/P and myself respecting the intelligence requirements of the Operational Offices. Also reported on my recent discussions with Fisher Howe and State's unwillingness to take any action in the field of intelligence support of psychological or other covert operations. 19 August, 15

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- 6 Spoke to [] respecting the desirability of a study of the intelligence support requirements of the Operational Offices and my desire to use Mr. Hitchcock on this study. [] suggested to me that [] be added, so as not to take up too much of [] and I agreed. 23 August, 4

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- 7 Attended meeting in Mr. Wisner's office with Messrs. Wisner, [] [] At this meeting we initiated a joint survey to answer two basic questions, namely:

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(Cont'd.)
- a. What are the intelligence support requirements of the Operational Offices, and how are they to be met, from within CIA or from outside agencies?
 - b. What are the intelligence-producing potentialities of the Operational Offices (particularly OPC type operations), and how can they best be made available to the Intelligence Offices of CIA, and ultimately for the remainder of the intelligence community?

25X1 It was agreed that a written directive would be premature at this time. I later spoke to Dr. Andrews, informing him of this survey. I suggested that he have [redacted] coordinate his thinking on overt collection with this survey. I so mentioned this survey to [redacted] and, at the Tuesday Deputies' meeting, to the DCI and to Mr. Dulles. 25 August, 5

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Discussed with Mr. [redacted] the following:

- a. [redacted] informed me that the information that I had previously received as to the source of the information contained in the [redacted] cable, which the Joint Staff had not sent to O/CI, was not entirely accurate. Nevertheless, it was felt that the Military did receive information from SO through Military channels and also delayed transmission of CIA's own messages until their authorities had received such material through Military channels. 25X1
- b. An attempt will be made to document the facts respecting the [redacted] cable. 25X1
- c. Explored with [redacted] any concern which he may have had regarding the survey we are making of the intelligence requirements of the covert offices. It developed that [redacted] was not concerned as to the use of Mr. [redacted] or the fact of the survey, but had some views as to how it would be best to make available to the Operational Offices the fund of information available in O/CI. I indicated that this was the only one aspect of the problem that concerned me, since I felt the needs of the Operational Offices were much broader than any that could be fulfilled by O/CI. 25X1
- d. Discussed briefly with [redacted] the personnel requirements we have for people trained in [redacted] use of Special Intelligence and he suggested that I speak to [redacted]. I later made arrangements to do this. 6 September, 5

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9 Following the Deputies' meeting, sat down with Frank Wisner and [redacted] to review the situation respecting research support of psychological warfare operations by the Operational Offices. At this time I reviewed with Mr. Wisner my discussions with Fisher Howe, et al., last week and my views respecting the POC proposal. After some discussion, we agreed to recommend to the Director tomorrow morning that both Mr. Wisner and I attend the PSB on Thursday in connection with the proposed briefing on this subject. I had previously spoken to the Director, who indicated that he would accept my recommendation as to whether or not I should be present at that meeting. With respect to the POC activity, [redacted] explained his understanding which was that it called attention to the need of an overall review of the total Soviet PW effort. On that I briefed Mr. Wisner and [redacted] at the proposed propaganda analysis unit being set up by [redacted] and expressed the view that

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such unit, as presently planned, would not be capable of taking on such a major research task. As to over-all evaluation of the Soviet PW effort, I raised the question as to whether such an estimate would be valid in vacuo. Our view was that the total activity would have to be taken account of and the PW effort would only be a portion of the whole. This tied in with the suggestion I had heard previously, (Cont'd) in which there was much good sense, to the effect that the Politburo itself was a psychological warfare mechanism. At the conclusion of this meeting, it was agreed that ~~Mr. Wisner~~ and Mr. Wisner would be briefed by their own people and then we could talk the situation over tomorrow. 8 September, 3

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Chatted with Dr. Chadwell and [redacted] 25X1
In the talk with [redacted], I touch briefly on my standard topics with [redacted] 25X1
namely, the difference between US and [redacted] organization and the distinction between joint estimating and joint working papers and conferences. [redacted] is enthusiastic about the possibilities of noise listening and feels that it should be substantially expanded. Both of us appear to be having the same type of difficulty with secret intelligence operations and I ventured the view that the only practical solution was to transfer properly-qualified individuals into the covert operation itself. 24 September, 5

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Mr. [redacted] Acting Chief Operations, DD/P, invited comments and questions from the LADS with respect to relations between the Overt and Covert Offices. It was the sense of the meeting that, in general, relations are good and are improving with certain difficulties still to be overcome. Among the latter, the following were mentioned:

- a. The Overt Offices would appreciate sanitized charts for distribution to the Division Chief level showing key covert titles, including initial designations, with telephone numbers. It would be helpful, although not necessary, if names could be supplied.
- b. It was pointed out that senior personnel of the DD/P complex reporting in to headquarters from the field invariably have intelligence information of interest to the DD/I Offices. Mr. [redacted] was requested to inform the DD/I as to the availability of such personnel for debriefing on matters of intelligence interest so that the Board of National Estimates and other interested Offices might be informed.
- c. Mr. Amory mentioned some cases of proselyting that had come to his attention; questions relating to the rotation aspects of the Career Service Plan were discussed.

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Mr. [redacted] remarked the slow but steady growth of a point of view in the Covert Offices minimizing reluctance on the part of DD/P personnel to accede to proper approaches and requests, and encouraging contacts with Overt personnel, so long as such contacts are kept in recognized channels. The plan to loan an O/CI analyst to the covert cable organization so as to aide covert personnel in recognizing intelligence requirements was reviewed. Mr. Becker summarized recent conversations with representatives of the intelligence area of the Department of State in which State had been urged to initiate action to survey and coordinate intelligence support

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for psychological operations, both overt and covert. State has indicated that the problem has received serious consideration but that they were not prepared to take immediate action, in part on the theory that the present requirements are being met to the best of their ability and, in part, on the feeling that a large portion of the area to be coordinated lies within the control of operational organizations rather than in the intelligence community. As a result, it will be necessary to have the Agency's needs surveyed and recommendations made as to how they can be satisfied.

11 This is to be done jointly by a representative of the Operational Offices and a
(Cont'd) representative of the Intelligence Offices. Such a survey might result in a substantial increase in DD/P organic intelligence units which would then afford a type of detailed support for psychological operations which State is not presently set up to afford. 14 IAD, 1

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